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Bill Allen in Class
Eric A. Chiappinelli°
In the Fall of 1996 I read a news article about a Delaware
Supreme Court case involving corporate law.' Buried at the end of the
article was the suggestion that William T. Allen, Delaware's Chancel-
lor for over ten years, was contemplating leaving the bench.2 My first
reaction was surprise coupled with sadness. Chancellor Allen was, I
thought, at fifty-two, well under the age when many people retire.
Although the heyday of takeovers had passed, there surely were many
such battles going on in which he could have a say. Takeovers aside,
corporate law as a discipline seemed as alive today as it ever had.
Surely the Chancellor would have been reappointed for the asking.'
Even if he did not intend to serve out a full twelve year term, he could
serve half or so and then retire.
Startled as I was to learn that he was leaving, I was delighted to
discover where he was going. The article said he was deciding between
teaching jobs at Harvard, NYU, and Stanford.4 Delighted, but not
surprised. He had visited at law schools a few times while Chancel-
lor.5 I also had seen him several times as a speaker at Northwestern's
Securities Regulation Institute, and Tulane's Corporate Law Institute.'
Over the intervening months, the grapevine reported that NYU was
the school of choice for the Chancellor. In due time, NYU law
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1. Stephanie Strom, A Setback for Perelman Affects Tactic on Mergers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24,
1996, at D5.
2. Id. ("People close to Judge [sic] Allen... said he probably would not seek renomination
next year .. ").
3. See, Diana B. Henriques, Top Business Court Under Fire, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1995,
at D1 (Joseph Flom, a premier takeover lawyer, "deemed it highly unlikely that Governor Carper
... would deny Chancellor Allen a new term. 'People would be shocked,' Mr. Flom said. 'Bill
Allen is an extremely competent judge."').
4. Strom, supra note 1, at D5.
5. He has been an adjunct professor at Penn, and has visited at Stanford twice and at Yale.
Five More Stars Join Law School's Permanent Faculty, NYU, Autumn 1997, at 27.
6. E.g., 8 TUL. CORP. L. INST (1996) and 23 SEC. REG. INST. (1996).
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school's glossy magazine featured Professor William T. Allen among
its new faculty hires.7
Given the scholarliness of his opinions and his experiences as a
visiting professor, it was clear that Professor Allen would start his new
life as an academic of the first water. This was my vision of the
Chancellor as Professor: All of us in academia would look forward to
having Bill Allen as a colleague and to seeing his effect on the
academic side of corporate law. We'd mingle with him at conferences
and read the no doubt prolific scholarship he would produce. These
meetings and written pieces would in turn prod our own thoughts and
thus work their way to our students. By the close of his career in
academia, students throughout the country would have been exposed
indirectly to, and influenced enormously by, the mind of William
Allen. If Holmes's aphorism about the life cycle of case law were
true,' Bill Allen seemed likely to extend his influence, perhaps by
decades, by shifting from the judiciary to the professoriate. 9
But then I realized that Bill Allen's classroom influence was
enormous already. I don't mean simply the students he has taught
when a visiting professor. Nor do I mean, exactly, the ceuvre of
opinions which has educated all of us interested in corporate law.
Rather, it suddenly occurred to me that Allen's thoughts have directly
shaped the views of literally thousands of law students already. His
opinions and articles are featured prominently in the corporations
casebooks used in virtually all American law schools. I find this aspect
of Bill Allen's influence to be truly astonishing. A trial court judge
whose first opinions appeared only twelve years ago finds his thoughts
pervasively presented to nearly every law student in America. It may
not be an exaggeration to say that, in moving from enormously
influential judge to professor, Bill Allen will both effect and affect law
in a way matched only by that of Joseph Story, who combined teaching
at the Harvard Law School and service as an Associate Justice on the
7. Five More Stars Join Law School's Permanent Faculty, supra note 5, at 26. The magazine
also reports that Allen will have a joint appointment with the business school and that he will be
director of a new Center for Law and Business. Id.
8. "It is a great mistake to be frightened by the ever-increasing number of reports. The
reports of a given jurisdiction in the course of a generation take up pretty much the whole body
of the law, and restate it from the present point of view. We could reconstruct the corpus from
them if all that went before were burned." OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Path of the Law,
in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167, 169 (1920).
9. Perhaps the most salient example of corporate law academics' influence extending beyond
the single generation ascribed by Holmes to case law is ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C.
MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
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Supreme Court of the United States. I can think of no other important
judge who moved to teaching after a distinguished career on the bench.
Nor is Bill Allen represented in the casebooks by just a leading
opinion or two. Once I began to look through the current casebooks,
I was struck by the variety of issues the editors had chosen to illustrate
through the work of Bill Allen. Half a dozen casebooks published by
the three principal casebook publishers deal with corporate law.1" All
of them have at least one excerpt from an opinion or an article by
Chancellor Allen. Four of them have at least five different excepts and
one, the most magisterial of corporation law casebooks, has seven.'1
In all, no fewer than fifteen different opinions and three different
articles are presented in the various casebooks. 2 What follows is a
brief precis of the pedagogical settings for Allen's work.
A. A Typical Casebook
Let me start by describing to what students in a typical corpora-
tions class might be exposed. One of the most popular casebooks is
O'Kelley and Thompson's. The authors of that book use six of
Chancellor Allen's cases in five different settings. Assuming the
professor moves through the material in the same order as the casebook
presents it, a student's first encounter with the Chancellor is through
Grimes v. Donald,'3 an illustration of the scrutiny courts will give
management agreements that arguably infringe on the board's statutory
duty to manage the corporation.' 4 Chancellor Allen views the issue
in the Grimes case as an example of the larger social choice of locating
all corporate power in the board rather than in the ultimate owners
10. ROBERT W. HAMILTON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS (5th ed. 1994);
LEWIS D. SOLOMON, ET AL., CORPORATIONS LAW AND POLICY (3d ed. 1994); JOEL
SELIGMAN, CORPORATIONS (1995); JESSE H. CHOPER, ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CORPORATIONS (4th ed. 1995); CHARLES R. OKELLEY, JR. & ROBERT B. THOMPSON,
CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS (2d ed. 1996); and WILLIAM L. CARY
& MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS (7th ed. 1995).
11. Joel Seligman, in the introduction of his casebook, is explicit in his belief that corporate
law has become essentially federal securities law. Thus, he treats securities law much more
extensively than other casebooks. SELIGMAN, supra note 10, at xxi. Nonetheless, he uses at least
one Allen opinion, Lacos Land Co. v. Arden Group, Inc., 517 A.2d 271 (Del. Ch. 1986);
SELIGMAN, supra note 10, at 511. The most magisterial casebook in corporate law is CARY &
EISENBERG, supra note 10.
12. I am including in this tally only principal cases or excerpts and extended note
discussions from the casebooks cited in note 10 supra.
13. Grimes v. Donald, No. 13358, 1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS 3 (Jan. 12, 1995), affd, 673 A.2d
1207 (Del. 1996), excerpted in OKELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 10, at 186.
14. The board's duty to manage the corporation is found at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 141(a) (1991).
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(i.e., the shareholders) or the corporate executives (i.e., manage-
ment).'5 The student is also exposed to a description of a complicat-
ed employment agreement which the Chancellor deftly distills to two
pages.' 6 Finally, the student gets the benefit of Chancellor Allen's
analysis, not only of the corporate law issues, but of the drafting issues
as well. Evaluating the central contractual language, the Chancellor
calls it "foolish," "ill-conceived," "unskillful," and "badly flawed.' 17
The student's second exposure to Chancellor Allen is in a
corporate opportunity case, Cellular Information Systems, Inc. v. Broz
(Broz).' The student learns that the corporate opportunity doctrine
is an offshoot of the basic duty of loyalty and that it is roughly
analogous to the tort of misappropriation.' 9  But then, having
explained generally what corporate opportunity is about, the Chancellor
introduces a factual wrinkle that, in other hands, might have muddied
the opinion. In the Broz case, though, Chancellor Allen uses the quirk
to explicate how corporate opportunity and misappropriation are
different and shows how the duty of loyalty is fundamentally grounded
in the director's agreement to serve as a director.20 As an extra fillip,
the student sees Chancellor Allen grappling with a recurrent issue of
equity: how the appropriate remedy is to be shaped."
The importance of remedy is brought home in the next encounter
with Chancellor Allen. It is difficult to imagine a more recondite
corporate law issue for a student in a survey course than the question
of whether a shareholder may recover rescissionary2" damages in a
cash out merger. The issue is an important one, though, because the
availability of rescission rather than appraisal provides enormous
incentives for management to structure transactions that arguably
overcompensate shareholders; conversely, the absence of rescission as
an available remedy encourages management to undercompensate the
owners.
15. O'KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 10, at 190.
16. Id. at 188-89.
17. Id. at 193.
18. Cellular Info. Sys., Inc. v. Broz, 663 A.2d 1180 (Del. Ch. 1995), rev'd, 673 A.2d 148
(Del. 1996), excerpted in O'KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 10, at 416.
19. Id. at 421.
20. Id. at 421-22.
21. Id. at 426-28.
22. Which for some reason the Delaware courts insist on calling "rescissory." See, e.g.,
International Equity Capital Growth Fund, L.P. v. Clegg, No. Civ. A. 14995, 1997 WL 208955,
at *1 (Del. Ch. Apr. 22, 1997).
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Nevertheless, Professors O'Kelley and Thompson edit Chancellor
Allen's 1994 opinion in Cinerama Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc.23 to present
a perfectly clear (though admittedly intricate) description of the remedy
issues in a cash out merger.2 4 By the time students have worked their
way through the ten casebook pages of the Chancellor's decision, they
have seen how rescissionary damages are different from appraisal
awards and two premises that animate the granting of rescission.2"
(Quite a lot for an assignment that is half as long as the usual class
hour's reading.)
Professors O'Kelley and Thompson next use Chancellor Allen to
address an area of corporate law that is every bit as problematic as the
rescission versus appraisal question: whether a shareholder who sells
a control block of shares to a person who then damages the corporation
is liable to the corporation or its minority shareholders. In Harris v.
Carter,26 Chancellor Allen epitomizes a series of non-Delaware
leading cases that contemplate liability in some instances. He roots his
decision that liability will be predicated on the forseeability of harm in
basic tort law duties. Those duties, says the Chancellor, control over
the specific setting of corporate law with its assumption of free
alienability.27
Finally, Professors O'Kelley and Thompson present Chancellor
Allen's views on one of the most central, though least explicitly
discussed, aspects of corporate law: the equitable nature of corporate
rights and their enforcement through the Delaware Court of Chancery.
The concrete setting is the power of the courts to examine with
heightened scrutiny managerial actions that impede shareholder voting
rights. In one of the Chancellor's most thoughtful opinions, Blasius
Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp. (Blasius),28 he explores the theory of the
most basic decision in corporate law: the allocation of power between
shareholders and directors.
In the Blasius case, the Chancellor eloquently affirms the power
of the courts to overturn legal board action (legal in the sense that no
statutory provision has been violated) when the action is inherently
inequitable. In doing so, he revivifies a tradition of Delaware corporate
23. 663 A.2d 1134 (Del. Ch. 1994), aff'd, 663 A.2d 1156 (Del. 1995).
24. Id., excerpted in O'KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 10, at 824.
25. Id. at 827-30.
26. Harris v. Carter, 582 A.2d 222 (Del. Ch. 1990), excerpted in O'KELLEY & THOMPSON,
supra note 10, at 852.
27. Id. at 859-61.
28. 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988), excerpted in O'KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 10,
at 952.
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law that was in danger of being overlooked in the takeover era of the
1980s.2 9 With a deft application of the power to distinguish cases
having substantially similar facts, the Chancellor rescues the Blasius
setting from the deference to the board that would have been expected
and, instead, holds that the board cannot disenfranchise the sharehold-
ers unless it can show a "compelling justification." The only
justification for the board's disenfranchising the shareholders is a
paternalistic one that the Chancellor rejects, saying, "The theory of our
corporation law confers power upon directors as the agents of the
shareholders; it does not create Platonic masters. 3
B. The Range of Issues for Which Casebooks Use Chancellor Allen
Using a casebook such as O'Kelley & Thompson suggests what a
typical corporations student might encounter in the course of a
semester's study of corporate law. Let me now broaden my focus and
take the current corporations casebooks as a group to see the areas in
which they use Chancellor Allen's writings.
Four of the casebooks use Chancellor Allen's writings to illustrate,
at the most abstract level, attributes of the corporate form itself. Cary
& Eisenberg uses Katz v. Oak Indus., Inc.31 and Cridit Lyonnais Bank
Nederland, N. V v. Pathi Communications Corp. (Credit Lyonnais)32
to address the constituencies to which directors owe their duties.
Choper, et al. also uses Cridit Lyonnais in this way.33 Hamilton and
Solomon, et al. both use a law review article, Our Schizophrenic
29. That tradition is usually referred to as the Schnel line of cases from Schnell v. Chris
Craft Indus., 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971). In contradistinction to the Schnell line of cases was the
so-called "equal dignity" line holding that each section of the Delaware corporation law was
entitled to equal dignity such, meaning that the Delaware courts would largely sanction board
actions that comported with the corporations code even though, if other sections of the code had
been applied, the action would have been impermissible. See Hariton v. Arco Elec., Inc., 188
A.2d 123 (Del. 1963).
30. Blasius Indus., 564 A.2d at 663, excerpted in O'KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 10,
at 966. Immediately following the discussion of the Blasius case, Professors O'Kelley and
Thompson present a squib of another Chancellor Allen case, Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc., 579
A.2d 1115 (Del. Ch. 1990), excerpted in O'KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 10, at 966. In
Stahl, the Chancellor declined to give a strong reading to Blasius on facts that arguably would
support application of the "compelling justification" standard.
31. 508 A.2d 873 (Del. Ch. 1986), excerpted in CARY & EISENBERG, supra note 10, at 232.
32. No. 12150, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 215 (Dec. 30, 1991), excerpted in CARY &
EISENBERG, supra note 10, at 233.
33. Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathi Communications Corp., No. 12150,
1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 215 (Dec. 30, 1991), excerpted in CHOPER, ET AL., supra note 10, at 46.
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Conception of the Business Corporation, to show both the enduring
tensions in corporate law and Allen's approach to the subject.34
The bulk of any Corporations course deals with the internal
governance rules of corporations. Those rules allocate power among
the primary constituencies of shareholders, directors, and officers; grant
shareholders rights in securing and protecting their interests; and
describe the fiduciary duties of directors and officers to the corporation
and its shareholders. As might be expected, Chancellor Allen is
represented in all three aspects of corporate governance in nine
different decisions.
Two casebooks, Cary & Eisenberg and Solomon, et al., use the
Blasius decision to present the question of the appropriate allocation of
decisional power between shareholders and directors rather than using
the case, as O 'Kelley & Thompson does, for its teachings about a
change of control setting.35 Cary & Eisenberg also uses a post-Blasius
case, Hoschett v. TSI International Software, Ltd., to expand upon the
same point.36 Finally, as we have seen, O 'Kelley & Thompson uses
Grimes v. Donald to examine the limits on the constituents' power to
circumscribe board authority.37
Two Chancellor Allen opinions dealing with shareholder rights are
included in four of the corporations casebooks. Cary & Eisenberg and
Solomon, et al., employ RB Associates of N.J., L.P. v. Gillette Co. to
explicate shareholder inspection rights beyond the statutorily required
shareholder list.38 Seligman and Choper, et al., use Lacos Land Co.
v. Arden Group, Inc. to show the limits of using the corporation's
certificate of incorporation to disenfranchise shareholders by creating
dual class voting stock.39
Fiduciary duties are traditionally divided into the Duty of Care
and the Duty of Loyalty. Chancellor Allen's opinions involving both
aspects are represented in several casebooks. On the Duty of Care
34. William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14
GARDOZO L. REV. 261 (1992), excerpted in HAMILTON, supra note 10, at 600 and excerpted in
SOLOMON, ET AL., supra note 10, at 8, 11.
35. Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988), excerpted in GARY
& EISENBERG, supra note 10, at 265 and excerpted in SOLOMON, ET AL., supra note 10, at 428.
36. Hoschett v. TSI Int'l Software, Ltd., 683 A.2d 43 (Del. Ch. 1996) (Allen, C.), excerpted
in MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 1997 SUPPLEMENT,
at 30.
37. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
38. No. 9711, 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 40 (Mar. 22, 1988), excerpted in GARY & EISENBERG,
supra note 10, at 318 and excerpted in SOLOMON, ET AL., supra note 10, at 440.
39. 517 A.2d 271 (Del. Gh. 1986), excerpted in SELIGMAN, supra note 10, at 511, and
excerpted in CHOPER, ET AL., supra note 10, at 546.
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side, Cary & Eisenberg uses In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative
Litigation4" to suggest that the much criticized Delaware case of
Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co.4 is, indeed, dead. Solomon, et
al., uses the case in similar fashion.42
As I have noted, Professors O'Kelley and Thompson use the Broz
case to teach the corporate opportunity aspect of the Duty of Loyal-
ty.43 Choper, et al., uses Cridit Lyonnais to give an example of a rare
situation in which the directors owe allegiance, not to the corporation's
shareholders, but to its creditors. 4
Finally, in the change of control situations, several of the most
well known Chancellor Allen opinions surface. A speech and a law
review article are used in two casebooks to survey the 1980s takeover
mania. 45  Two cases, Harris v. Carter46 and Mendel v. Carroll47,
show two related aspects of the sale of control. Harris, as we have
seen, deals with a selling shareholder's potential liability for subsequent
damage to the minority shareholders.48 The Mendel case visits the
classic issue of whether a shareholder who sells a controlling block of
shares at a premium to the market price may keep the premium or
must share that premium pro rata with the minority shareholders.49
O'Kelley & Thompson and Choper, et al., between them present
four of Chancellor Allen's opinions in the classic 1980s hostile takeover
40. 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996), excerpted in EISENBERG, supra note 36, at 72.
41. 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963).
42. In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996), excerpted in
JEFFREY D. BAUMAN & ELLIOTT J. WEISS, CORPORATIONS LAW AND POLICY 1997 UPDATE
MEMORANDUM, at 2.
43. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
44. Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Path Communications Corp., No. 12150,
1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 215 (Dec. 30, 1991), excerpted in CHOPER, ET AL., supra note 10, at 237.
45. William T. Allen, U.S. Corporate Governance in a Post-Managerial Age (Oct. 20,
1993), excerpted in HAMILTON, supra note 10, at 1133, 1165; William T. Allen, Independent
Directors in MBO Transactions: Are They Fact or Fantasy?, 45 BUS. LAW. 2055 (1990), excerpted
in SOLOMON, ET AL., supra note 10, at 1311.
46. 582 A.2d 222 (Del. Ch. 1990).
47. 651 A.2d 297 (Del. Ch. 1994).
48. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
49. Mendel, 651 A.2d at 298, excerpted in CHOPER, ET AL., supra note 10, at 983.
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setting. Blasius5", Stahl"1 , Interco52, and Time 3 are all used to
show the limits on target management defensive measures.
C. Why Bill Allen's Writings Are So Teachable
I have examined the kinds of opinions a typical corporations
casebook includes and also the range of issues for which casebooks use
Chancellor Allen's writings. It remains to be seen whether we can be
explicit about the qualities of those writings, the judicial opinions in
particular, that make casebook editors select them.
One quality that helps immeasurably is Allen's prose style. His
writing is absolutely pellucid. This makes his work valuable in at least
two ways. First, it allows students (and lawyers generally) to grasp
quite complex transactions with as much ease as possible. Second, the
usual concomitant to pellucidity is brevity. While surely not epigram-
matic, Chancellor Allen's opinions are compact, thus allowing for
many ideas and descriptions to unfold quickly. To an editor trying to
pack as many doctrines as possible into as few casebook pages as
possible, this must be a significant virtue.
This precision in writing melds with another skill that all judicial
opinions share to some extent. Virtually all opinions lay out the facts,
articulate the rule of decision, and draw a conclusion from application
of the rule to the facts. Chancellor Allen's writing style, as I have just
observed, sets out the facts and the operative rule of law with extreme
clarity. His style also permits him to draw his legal conclusion in a
way that I think must be particularly attractive to students. Nothing
is worse, and few things more common, in a casebook opinion than for
a student to find an opinion's facts and law clear but the discussion of
the application of one to the other and the conclusion that follows to
be adumbrated. Many judges, having set out the major and minor
premises, simply skip to the holding. They do not elaborate on the
logical path by which they go from the general rule to the specific
result. Chancellor Allen, by contrast, is always explicit about the way
in which the results follow from his predicates. This aesthetic,
50. Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988), excerpted in
O'KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 10, at 952.
51. Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc., 579 A.2d 1115 (Del. Ch. 1990), excerpted in O'KELLEY
& THOMPSON, supra note 10, at 966.
52. City Capital Assocs. v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988), appeal dismissed,
556 A.2d 1070 (Del. 1988), excerpted in CHOPER, ET AL., supra note 10, at 917.
53. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 94,514 (Del. Ch. 1989), affd, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990), excerpted in CHOPER,
ET AL., supra note 10, at 919.
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explicating the consequences of his thinking without elision or ispe
dixit, helps the student understand the result of choosing one rule over
another and helps the student to grapple with the question of whether
the judge is right.
So far I have described characteristics common to opinions
generally, even though I hope I have made clear how Chancellor Allen
excels at them. He goes further in two different ways which, while not
unique to him, are, I believe, the qualities that account most for his
representation in corporate law casebooks. First, he typically describes
the origin of the rule at issue. While many judges do this from a sense
of pedantry, Chancellor Allen is thoroughly instrumental in his use of
doctrinal background. The point of talking about where a rule has
come from is so that one can intelligently know how the rule ought to
be shaped (or rejected) today. From a pedagogical view, this allows a
student to make a more informed and intelligent opinion of whether a
rule is appropriate.
Finally, Chancellor Allen has a knack of stating the core of a case
in such a way that he abstracts the legal question to precisely the level
at which casebooks are pitched. In other words, Chancellor Allen
introduces the issue by raising the level of abstraction to the same level
as the casebook rubric. This skill instantly allows the student to
connect the case to what has come before and what is to come after.
He or she can then imbed the case in the continuum of his or her
understanding of corporate law, ready to be retrieved at will.
Let me use the Broz case as excerpted in O'Kelley & Thompson
to illustrate some of these ideas.54 The case involved a director of
Cellular Information Systems, Inc., Mr. Broz, who caused his wholly
owned corporation to acquire rights to a cellular telephone system in
Michigan. In about three pages Chancellor Allen limns the facts with
a thoroughness that will allow for ample consideration in class of the
appropriate result, but will not result in 50 minutes spent diagramming
the facts on the board just to spend the next 50 minutes discussing the
case.5" Then he sets up the basic issue and raises it to a level of abstrac-
tion that jibes well with the casebook. Professors 0 'Kelley and Thompson
place Broz in the following schema:
Chapter 4, Fiduciary Duty, Derivative Litigation, and the Business
Judgment Rule
54. Cellular Info. Sys., Inc. v. Broz, 663 A.2d 1180 (Del. Ch. 1995), rev'd, 673 A.2d 148
(Del. 1996), excerpted in O'KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 10, at 416.
55. Id. at 418-21. If I tried to summarize the facts I'd either do so much less elegantly (and
with more prolixity) than the Chancellor or I'd just scratch the surface. Neither approach seems
appropriate here.
[Vol. 21:613
Tribute to Chancellor Allen
D. Law and Private Ordering Regarding Management Self-Interest
2. Common Law Approaches to Managers' Pursuit of Self-Interest
b. The Corporate Opportunity and Unfair Competition Doctrines56
Chancellor Allen locates the legal issue in four sentences that
nearly mirror the editors' four rubrics:
It is basic that service as a director of a corporation entails the
voluntary assumption of a duty of loyalty to the corporation, and in
some instance to the stockholders directly. Broadly speaking this
duty prevents or remedies conduct in which a corporate officer or
director uses her power with respect to corporate processes, or
property, or her access to confidential corporate information, to
advantage herself in a transaction that is not entirely fair to the
corporation. The so-called corporate opportunity doctrine, at least
when one considers the core cases it covers, falls easily within this
concept of loyalty. The classic corporate opportunity cases involve
instances in which officers or directors use for personal advantage
information that comes to them in their corporate capacity, by
diverting a profitable transaction from the corporation. 7
The Chancellor next describes the background of the corporate
opportunity doctrine and the current Delaware incarnation of that
rule.58 Then he applies the rule to the facts 9 and wrestles explicitly
with the difficulty in shaping an appropriate remedy.6°
Broz, as the Chancellor creates it, is a wonderful casebook case.
It gives the student precisely what he or she needs to know in terms
of corporate law doctrine and adds sufficient facts and policy implica-
tions so that the student can imagine how the case could have been
differently disposed of and whether it would have been preferable to
do so.
D. Bill Allen in My Class
When I first learned that Chancellor Allen was to become
Professor Allen, I was delighted for myself and my students as well as
for academics and law students generally. I knew his influence on my
own thinking about corporate matters and I anticipated that, as a law
56. Id. at 317, 401, 402, and 412.
57. Id. at 421.
58. Id. at 421-22.
59. Id. at 422-26.
60. Id. at 426-28.
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school professor, his influence on others would be equally pervasive
and more immediate. What I hadn't understood was that Bill Allen
is already in my class and has already influenced my students. It
seems to me entirely possible that American corporate law in the thirty
or forty years starting from 1985 will have been made by, and
discussed in terms framed by, William T. Allen. We had all of us,
students and scholars alike, best understand that Bill Allen is in class.
